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Abstract in English 
This CPB Document provides a framework for the evaluation of non-profit organisations. This 
framework addresses the question under which conditions, and, if so, in what way non-profits 
should be stimulated. Essentially, in order to answer these questions, three steps can be 
followed: (i) identifying potentially relevant market failures that non-profits may aim to 
diminish; (ii) linking market failures to observed performance indicators for profits and non-
profits; and (iii) use these insights to derive policy implications: should non-profits be 
stimulated? We apply the proposed framework to three sectors that are commonly labelled as 
‘social services’: the care sector, the childcare sector and welfare-to-work services. All these 
sectors are subject to substantial informational problems regarding the quality of services. 
When surveying the literature, we find non-profit organisations only to make a difference in 
some specific cases. So far, there is no strong evidence that can be used as an argument to 
stimulate non-profit organisations in mixed markets. Moreover, such (targeted) policies may 
discourage donated labour and private donations, thus rendering them largely ineffective.  
 
Key words: firm organisation, non-profit organisations and public enterprise, legal status. 
JEL code: L22, L3. 
 
Abstract in Dutch 
In dit rapport ontwikkelen we een kader ter bepaling van de omstandigheden waaronder het 
zinvol is voor de overheid om niet op winst gerichte organisaties te subsidiëren of anderszins te 
bevoordelen. Dit kader omvat de volgende onderdelen: (i) mogelijke marktfalens identificeren 
als rechtvaardiging voor niet op winst gerichte bedrijven; (ii) deze marktfalens koppelen aan de 
relatieve prestaties van niet op winst gerichte versus op winst gerichte organisaties; (iii) om met 
deze inzichten passende beleidsimplicaties te formuleren. Het kader passen we toe op 
ziekenhuizen en kinderopvang- en re-integratieinstellingen. Deze sectoren zijn allen sterk 
gevoelig voor informatieproblemen, met mogelijk een lage kwaliteit van dienstverlening als 
gevolg. Uit de internationale literatuur blijkt echter dat niet op winst gerichte organisaties alleen 
in specifieke gevallen betere kwaliteit leveren en dus vanuit dien hoofde geen sterke 
argumenten zijn om niet winstgerichte bedrijven te bevoordelen vanuit de overheid. Dit kan 
zelfs averechts werken wanneer het de intrinsieke motivatie van werknemers bij deze 
organisaties ondermijnt.  
 
Steekwoorden: non-profit organisaties. 
 
Een uitgebreide Nederlandse samenvatting is beschikbaar via www.cpb.nl.   4   5 
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Preface 
Although their role and form have changed substantially, not-for-profit (NFP) organisations still 
serve as important delivery mechanisms of public services in the Netherlands. Advocates of 
NFPs argue that these act in the interest of society as a whole, that they have more public sector 
motivation than for-profit (FP) firms, and are better capable of meeting local needs than public 
organisations do. Examples include parental support in non-profit childcare organisations, or 
case-workers in the social sector that are intrinsically motivated to get less advantaged 
unemployed clients back to work. Opponents to NFP organisations however doubt the 
legitimacy of NFPs, arguing that the distinction between the profit and non-profit status has 
become largely irrelevant, both for its workers and its consumers. 
 
This CPB Document provides a framework for the (economic) evaluation of NFP organisations. 
As such, CPB aims to contribute to the discussion on the pros and cons of NFPs, as well as the 
(regulatory) role of the public sector vis-à-vis NFPs. In the document, the framework that is 
proposed is applied to the hospital industry, child care and welfare-to-work services. For all 
these sectors, we are primarily guided by the international empirical literature, which is almost 
entirely based on data for North-America. The CPB document is published simultaneously with 
a CPB Memorandum that studies the evolution of the provision of childcare services by NFP 
and FP organisations in the Netherlands. We expect and hope this study marks the beginning of 
more empirical studies examining the conduct and performance of FP and NFP organisations in 
Dutch context. 
 
This study has been written and coordinated by Pierre Koning, in close collaboration with a 
team of colleagues. Joëlle Noailly and Sabine Visser have contributed to sections 3.1-3.3 by 
providing literature reviews on the hospital industry and the child care sector, respectively. 
Gijsbert Zwart has contributed to section 3.4. Marko Bos (SER), Paul de Bijl, Raymond Gradus 
(Free University Amsterdam and Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment), Paul Grout 
(CMPO and University of Bristol), Jelte Theisens (Ministry of Economic Affairs) and Bert 
Tieben (SER) are gratefully acknowledged for comments on earlier versions of this study. 
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Summary 
A framework for the analysis of non-profits 
In many countries, non-for-profit (NFP) organisations comprise an important part of the 
employment and production of workers. Although their role and form have changed 
substantially, NFP organisations still serve as important delivery mechanisms of public 
services. Advocates of NFPs argue that they may have more ‘public sector motivation’ than for-
profit (FP) firms and are better capable of meeting local needs. Examples include parental 
support in non-profit childcare organisations or case-workers in the social sector that are 
intrinsically motivated to get less advantaged unemployed clients back to work. Opponents 
however doubt the legitimacy of NFPs. In particular, they argue that for both workers and 
consumers the distinction between profit and non-profit status is largely irrelevant. Like FPs, 
NFP organisations may encounter internal agency problems in monitoring their employees. 
These problems may even be larger than for FPs, since there is no market in ownership shares 
to prevent ‘managerial shirking’. 
 
This CPB Document provides a framework for the evaluation of non-profit organisations. In 
particular, it addresses the question under which conditions, and, if so, in what way non-profits 
should be stimulated. Essentially, the framework that is needed to answer these questions 
consists of three steps: (i)  identifying relevant market failures that non-profits may respond to 
or try to diminish; (ii) linking market failures to performance indicators for profits and non-
profits; and (iii) use these insights to derive policy implications: should non-profits be 
stimulated? With this analysis, we combine recent advances in both theoretical and empirical 
economic analyses, so as to expose the legitimacy and effectiveness of non-profits. We apply 
the proposed framework to three sectors that are commonly labelled as ‘social services’: the 
care sector, the childcare sector and welfare-to-work (WTW) services. All these sectors are 
subject to substantial informational problems regarding the quality of services. Workers in these 
sectors may be intrinsically motivated to deliver social services. At the same time, the public 
interest in these sectors is substantial. In Anglo-Saxon countries, these markets are typically 
mixed, with both FP and NFP organisations.  
 
In our analysis, we first characterise NFPs as potential ‘market failure correcting devices’, with 
asymmetric information, market power, (positive) externalities and distributional concerns as 
potentially relevant market failures. These market failures may trigger NFP organisations to act 
in the interest of consumers or society as a whole by providing higher quality of services and 
increasing the accessibility of services for consumers with a low income. The next question to 
be addressed is whether NFPs indeed make a difference with respect to the quality and 
accessibility of services. If not, the public sector may decide to use generic regulatory or   10 
subsidy measures to combat market failures ─ irrespective of the legal status of service 
providers.  
 
If NFPs make a difference and market failures are still important, there are three additional 
conditions that should be met in order to favour NFP organisations vis-à-vis FP organisations: 
performance outcomes should be hard to contract upon; subsidisation should not lead to 
substantial crowding out effects of donated labour and donations; and FP organisations should 
not be triggered to become NFPs, so as to extract subsidy rents. If these conditions are not met, 
standard regulatory measures that are not directed to a specific legal status should be carried out 
to correct for market failures.  
The case of social services 
When surveying the literature for the US and Canada on hospitals, child care and welfare-to-
work (WTW) services, the key market failure is that of information asymmetry. In particular, 
service providers have the opportunity to skimp on quality aspects that are hard to monitor 
(‘moral hazard’). NFP organisations often consider the combat of these moral hazard problems 
as their primary goal ─ that is, they aim at providing better quality, which is in the interest of 
consumers. The evidence, however, suggests that NFPs only incidentally make a difference on 
quality. Thus, there is no strong argument here to favour organisations only because of their 
non-profit status. In contrast, there is some evidence that NFPs make a difference by providing 
services in specific markets ─ particularly with low competition ─ or to specific consumer 
types. This means that one of the most apparent aims of NFPs boil down to distributional 
concerns. If the government has similar (distributional) interests, this however is not an 
argument per se for favouring NFPs. Rather than that, subsidisation may take place by vouchers 
for specific consumer types. Particularly the accessibility of services by hospitals and child care 
organisations for low income customers is relatively well observable and therefore can be 
contracted on. Finally, and similar to FP organisations, NFPs seem susceptive to rents 
extraction. Generally, wages that NFP organisations pay are not systematically lower than FP 
organisations, efficiency costs are similar, and NFPs seem to respond equally to changes in 
competition. What this suggests is that donated labour and donations of NFP organisations ─ 
creating an advantage with respect to FPs ─ are not substantial, or are undone by inefficiencies. 
 
Overall, for the three sectors under consideration the case for favouring NFP organisations by 
the government is weak: (i) NFPs do not seem to make a systematic difference in quality of 
accessibility of services; (ii) Residual market failures are often hard to substantiate; (iii) Some 
performance aspects of accessibility and ─ to a lesser extent ─ quality can be contracted upon, 
irrespective of the legal status of organisations; (iv) Public sector support for NFPs may crowd 
out private donations and donated labour; and (iv) Public sector support may trigger FP 
organisations to become NFP as well, but maximising rents extraction by other means than   11 
profit extraction. To conclude, the most apparent form of public sector intervention in mixed 
markets therefore is that of regulation. In particular, the public sector can increase market 
transparency and set quality standards, or subsidise the provision of services for particular 
consumer types or particular market types.  
 
Policy implications 
One of the basic policy lessons that follows from this ─ at least for social services ─ is that 
there is no obvious economic rationale for governments to subsidise or facilitate NFP 
organisations in favour of FP organisations. Essentially, this lesson also applies to the 
Netherlands, at least with respect to the child care and WTW-sectors. In both sectors, the 
primary goal of the government should be to increase the transparency of performance 
outcomes of (all) service providers, rather than relying upon the benevolence of NFP 
organisations exclusively. In the childcare sector, the recent liberalisation act seems well in line 
with this notion ─ NFP organisations are no longer subsidised by communities with exclusive 
contracts ─ albeit that the childcare market is still far from transparent. For the Dutch care 
sector, the policy implications of US studies should be interpreted with more care. Here, the 
major difference with the US is that all hospitals in the Netherlands are NFPs (FP hospitals are 
prohibited). The hospital market is not a mixed market, rendering the US evidence less relevant. 
In order to assess the impact of the entry of FP hospitals, the government could experiment by 
allowing some hospitals in some markets (or for some activities) to make profits. Next, 
performance outcomes relating to both the quality and accessibility of hospital services of FP 
and NFP hospitals can be compared. As an alternative, one may (already) compare hospitals 
with and without medical doctors and specialists that operate in partnerships where profits are 
allowed for. 
 
From the analysis, we conclude that the non-profit condition is not a sufficient condition for 
‘making a difference’ on quality or accessibility. This observation ─ i.e. the absence of any 
systematic proof that NFPs make a difference ─ in turn may discourage the provision of 
donated labour and private donations. The success of NFPs relies upon the existence of clear 
organisational missions that are actively given account for. This means they inform customers 
on the quality of services that have been provided, as well as the specific markets and client 
groups they want to focus on. Otherwise, there is a large risk that ─ particularly for larger 
organisations ─ the distinction between FP and NFP status becomes largely anachronistic. 
 
As a final remark, it should be stressed that our arguments against favouring NFPs by the 
government are not an argument against NFPs. Instead, from our analysis we conclude that 
NFPs in fact can make a difference vis-à-vis FPs, particularly in markets where competition is 
low and/or when there is not many regulatory measures being taken by the government. In these 
markets, NFPs are probably are capable of attracting intrinsically more motivated workers.   12 
More specifically, the virtues of NFPs are probably highest when market failures are 
substantial, and hard to be resolved by the government. But again, this is not an argument per se 
to stimulate NFPs, as one cannot (only) rely upon the legal status of these organisations, and 
this may even weaken performance.   
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1  Introduction 
1.1  Research question 
In many countries, not-for-profit (NFP) organisations comprise an important part of the 
employment and production of workers. As a percentage of the economically active population, 
Salamon et al. (2003) find the Dutch non-profit sector to be the world’s largest (14.4%). The 
origins of the Dutch non-profit sector lie way back in the past, when many organisations were 
founded by institutions or private individuals. Later on, these mostly charitable organisations 
gradually transformed into professionalized welfare institutions (see e.g. Veldheer and Burger, 
1999).  
 
Although their role and form have changed substantially, NFP organisations still serve as 
important delivery mechanisms of public services. Advocates of NFPs argue that rents are used 
to the interest of society as a whole, that they have more public sector motivation than for-profit 
(FP) firms and are better capable of meeting local needs. Examples include parental support in 
non-profit childcare organisations or case-workers in the social sector that are intrinsically 
motivated to get less advantaged unemployed clients back to work. Following this line of 
reasoning, the ‘Commissie Wijffels’ stresses the importance of fostering and stimulating private 
NFP organisations (Ministerie van Justitie, 2006; Wetenschappelijk Instituut voor het CDA, 
2005). Opponents to NFP organisations however doubt the legitimacy of NFPs.
1 In particular, 
they argue that for both employees and consumers the distinction between profit and non-profit 
status has become largely irrelevant. Like FPs, NFP organisations may encounter internal 
agency problems in monitoring their employees. These problems may even be larger than for 
FPs, since there is no market in ownership shares to prevent ‘managerial shirking’. 
 
For policy makers, assessing the role of NFPs is certainly nontrivial. One may argue that NFPs 
are just a fact of life, and should be treated similar to private FP organisations. Still, the formal 
missions of NFPs often show strong similarities with those of the government. NFPs generally 
aim at increasing the quality and accessibility of products, which may be an argument to 
stimulate NFPs, e.g. by favourable tax conditions. At the same time, one should be aware that 
the non-profit condition is not a sufficient condition to warrant social goals. There is a risk that 
rents provided by the government induce NFPs to raise wages, create inefficiencies, or even 
crowd out private donations or donated labour. 
 
 
1 In this discussion, the Dutch Social and Economic Council (SER) nuances the role of FP and NFP status (SER, 2005). 
Similar to NFPs, FP organisations may also adhere to public goals. And similar to NFPs, FP organisations then have to give 
account for these goals. This calls for good governance structures, regardless the legal status of organisations.   14 
At present, policy debates on the organisation of ‘public’ services in the Netherlands are 
twofold. First, there is a persistent discussion on allowing for the distribution of profits in 
sectors where profits in principle are prohibited. For the Netherlands, examples here include the 
hospital and education sector (see e.g. Dijkgraaf et al., 2006). Second, when considering mixed 
markets, there is a debate on the distinctive roles of both FP and NFP organisations, and ─ 
related to this ─ the usefulness of favouring non profits, particularly by tax exemptions on the 
surpluses that NFPs may make. In the Netherlands, the share of FP organisations in the 
childcare sector and welfare-to-work sector has grown steadily in recent years. This raises the 
question whether increased FP shares reflect higher cost efficiency of FPs vis-à-vis NFPs, or an 
increase in the importance of market failures by lower quality levels that are provided. 
 
This CPB Document provides a framework for the evaluation of non-profit organisations. In 
particular, it addresses the question under which conditions, and, if so, in what way non-profits 
should be stimulated. Essentially, the framework that is needed to answer these questions 
consists of three steps:  
 
(i)  Identifying potentially relevant market failures to which NFPs may be in response;  
 
(ii)  Linking market failures to performance indicators for profits and non-profits; and 
 
(iii) Use these insights to derive policy implications: should non-profits be stimulated?  
 
With this analysis, we combine recent advances in both theoretical and empirical economic 
analyses, so as to expose the legitimacy and effectiveness of NFPs. We apply the proposed 
framework to three sectors that are commonly labelled as ‘social services’: the hospital sector, 
the childcare sector and welfare-to-work (WTW) services. These sectors are all subject to 
substantial informational problems that may undermine the quality and accessibility of services. 
Furthermore, organisations in these sectors ─ both FPs and NFPs ─ are often large, with 
substantial professional standards that have to be met by their employees. Moreover, 
competition between organisations in these sectors can be large, raising questions on the extent 
to which NFPs can make a difference here. It is interesting to see whether NFP organisations 
can facilitate intrinsically motivated workers in such a setting.
2 
1.2  Methodological aspects 
In this study, we adopt a welfare economic perspective of NPFs: we present a framework so as 
to investigate and define the conditions under which NFP organisations are beneficial for 
 
2 This contrasts to so called ‘expressive functions’ (see Salamon et al. (2003)), which involve activities for the expression of 
cultural, religious or policy interests and beliefs, and where volunteer work is the dominant provider of labour.   15 
society and formulate and evaluate policy options that may of may not facilitate and stimulate 
NFPs to increase societal welfare. The key question here is whether such policies can be 
targeted at NFPs as a specific organisational type, or that more general (regulatory) measures 
are needed.  
 
Obviously, the value of the framework we propose lies in its applicability to real life cases. We 
therefore have selected three sectors to do this: the hospital industry, childcare and welfare-to-
work (WTW). More specifically, the choice of sectors can be summarised by the following 
keywords: public interest, professional standards, mixed markets, and empirical evidence: 
 
Public interest  
In this study, we focus on sectors where services are provided with substantial public interest: 
all sectors under consideration are plagued by substantial information problems regarding the 
quality of services that are provided. In this setting, the government either aims at services to be 
sufficiently accessible, or to warrant minimum quality standards. NFPs may have similar goals, 
and thus the government may decide to stimulate and facilitate these organisations. 
Professional standards 
We focus on sectors in which organisations have to meet various professional and educational 
standards that are set by the government. This means that NFP organisations cannot rely upon 
voluntary work as an important provider of labour. This contrasts to e.g. ideological or religious 
organisations, where voluntary work is the dominant provider of labour. When professional 
standards are important, the workforce of both NFP and FP organisations is dominated by paid 
workers, the possible difference between NFP and FP being that NFP workers are more 
intrinsically motivated.  
Mixed markets 
In all three sectors ─ and for many countries ─ both FP and NFP organisations operate as 
providers of services (‘mixed markets’). This means that FPs and NFPs in principle are 
competitors. There also may be mixed markets where public organisations provide services as 
well. In the Netherlands, this holds particularly for the education sector, where private 
education organisations are allowed for some market segments. Here, policy debates relate to 
the choice in which market segments private organisations should be allowed to operate and 
whether they should be allowed to operate on a level playing field, rather than relating to the 
legal status of these organisations (NFP versus FP). In this study, however, we abstract from 
these issues and concentrate on markets where private FP and private NFP organisations 
prevail. In this setting, the public sector takes regulatory measures, rather than providing 
services itself.    16 
Empirical evidence 
For the Netherlands, empirical evidence on the relative performance of NFPs vis-à-vis FPs is 
virtually absent. So far, in the international literature most evidence is based on data from the 
US and Canada. When surveying the literature, we therefore concentrate on these two countries, 
particularly for the care sector. Obviously, from these results we cannot make inference that can 
be fully translated to the Netherlands. Still, we believe that insights from the literature provide 
useful guidance on the determinants of the performance of NFPs, as well as the relative 
importance of legal status in explaining market outcomes, compared to e.g. the level of 
competition or the impact of regulatory measures by the public sector.  
 
In what follows, we explain and apply the proposed framework ─ that is, sections 2 to 4 address 
the three consecutive steps for three sectors under investigation. Section 5 concludes.  
   17 
2  The origin of NFPs; market failures 
2.1  Some statistics and institutional matters 
In the Netherlands, NFP organisations are either foundations or associations. Here, the key 
distinction is that associations consist of individual members, and foundations do not. Both of 
these organisations are treated similarly by the fiscal authorities (see text box). Table 2.1 reports 
the importance of NFP organisations for various (service) sectors, measured in terms of the total 
amount of national income that is devoted to them. 
Table 2.1  GDP spending on various social services sectors in 2002 (billion euro), stratified according to 
NFP, FP and public organisations 
Sector  Spending (bln)  For-profit  Not-for-profit  Public 
         
Government administration  13.0  0  0  100 
Defence  6.1  0  0  100 
Police, justice  9.0  0  5  95 
Fiscal authorities, social insurance  8.5  0  20  80 
Education and research  26.1  0  37  63 
Care  53.4  6  58  35 
Culture and recreation  15.2  18  48  34 
Social organisations  3.0  0  100  0 
Infrastructure  17.1  0  1  99 
Public transport  4.3  55  0  45 
Environment  7.0  60  0  40 
Public housing  12.9  25  75  0 
         
Total ‘social services’  175.6  20  39  41 
         
Source: SCP (2006)         
 
Table 2.1 makes apparent that NFP organisations are important in the administration of fiscal 
and social insurance, education and research, the care sector, the cultural and recreational sector 
and in public housing. In most of these sectors, however, NFPs do not compete with FPs. 
Instead, they are either predominantly publicly financed (fiscal and social insurance, education 
and research, care) or are social organisations that benefit from volunteer work. With regard to 
the first observation, the Dutch NFP sector can be characterised as joining a welfare partnership 
in which the state finances welfare services but relies heavily on private civil society 
organisations for their delivery (Salamon, 2003). It is only the care sector, the cultural and 
recreational sector and the public housing sector that can be characterised as mixed markets, 
with FP as well as NFP organisations. 
 
In the table, the three sectors under investigation ─ hospitals, child care and welfare-to-work ─ 
are part of the care sector. In 2002, about 165,000 workers (in full time equivalents) were   18 
employed at hospitals.
3 Of these, a small fraction consisted of voluntary work (22 thousand 
workers in 2002, mostly part time). In the child care sector, in 2002, and again expressed in full 
time equivalents, about 32 thousand workers where employed. At that time, organisations with 
a NFP status dominated the market
4, employing a negligible amount of voluntary work ─ that 
is, only 100 full time equivalents in 2000. From this, we conclude that voluntary work is not 
very important in the hospital and child care industry. 
The fiscal treatment of NFPs in the Netherlands 
In the Netherlands, the NFP status of organisations comes with some (potential) fiscal advantages. Obviously, the most 
important of these is the exemption from corporate taxes on surpluses that NFPs make. Fiscal authorities may deviate 
from this rule if they doubt the official mission of the NFP organisation. Next to this, there are three more aspects that 
are distinct from the fiscal treatment of FP organisations, particularly for small NFP organisations:  
 
•  NFPs are, up to a maximum amount of about 70 000 euro, exempted from sales taxes.  
•  In order to be exempted from taxes for the reimbursement of expenses for voluntary work, up to a maximum of 
700 euro per year, voluntary work is authorised only in a NFP setting. 
•  NFPs are exempted from taxes on donations when ‘beneficial to society’. This means that organisations should 
not only be NFP, but also give account on their goals, as well as the rewards for the board of governors. 
Information on the specific organisations that are registered as ‘beneficial to society’ is not publicly available.  
 
2.2  The economics of NFPs 
There are two main structural features that distinguish NFP organisations from FP 
organisations: (i) the ‘non-distribution-constraint’ and (ii) the absence of owners (Hansmann, 
1980; Glaeser, 2002). The ‘non-distribution-constraint’ states that there are strict limits to the 
appropriation of the organisation’s surplus in the form of profits for those who run and control 
it, such as its members, founders or governors. This contrasts with FPs, where shareholders are 
the residual claimants. Here, the owner is a shareholder whose aim it is to get a high return rate. 
Instead, NFPs are not accountable to any owner or shareholder, but are expected to benefit 
beneficiary stakeholders ─ that is, individual consumers, or society as a whole ─ by providing 
products on favourable terms. In this sense, NFPs can be regarded as ‘failure correcting 
devices’ that allocate more effort to the quality and the accessibility of their products.   
 
Donated labour is regarded as one of the key ingredients for the success of NFPs. NFPs are 
better capable of carrying out their missions when they attract workers that are, at least to some 
extent, intrinsically motivated to fulfil these missions. Stated differently, this means managers 
and workers are not driven by monetary incentives only, but also by the wellbeing of their 
beneficiary stakeholders ─ i.e. they are willing to work beyond their strict job description and 
 
3 Here, statistics on employment and voluntary work are obtained from CBS-Statline.  
4 By now, FP organisations dominate the Dutch child care sector. We return to this issue in the next section.   19 
donate extra effort than what was explicitly contracted. Following this line of arguing, one may 
expect wages to be lower in NFP than in FP organisations, with voluntary (unpaid) work as the 
most extreme form of donated labour.
5 We also may expect NFPs to receive more private 
donations than FPs do. Thus, the provision of donated labour and private donations can be 
considered as a mechanism explaining why NFPs actually can make a difference over FP firms.  
 
Donated labour is the most influential argument of economists for public or NFP provision, 
particularly in sectors where quality aspects of output are hard to contract upon (Francois, 
2001). The very lack of residual claimants or profit motive provides a valuable commitment to 
the worker at the same time: it tells that, in principle, there is no individual or group standing to 
gain from converting donated effort into extra profit for themselves. Nobody higher in the 
organisation has an incentive to cut back on elements of service provision because nobody in 
the organisation will gain by doing so.  
The Non-profit’s dictionary 
Donated labour: workers that are willing to work beyond their strict job description and/or donate extra effort than what 
was  explicitly  contracted.  Non-for-profit  organisations  are  more  likely  to  attract  donated  labour,  as  the  non-profit 
constraint commits these organisations not to expropriate worker efforts to lower costs and increase profits. 
 
Mission: not-for-profit organisations are usually organised around a given mission ─ e.g. providing good quality or 
serving specific target groups. This helps to attract donated labour and donations.  
 
The non-profit or non-distribution constraint:: non-profits cannot distribute any profits to anyone who exercises control on 
the firm, such as its members, founders or governors. Instead, surpluses have to be reinvested in the organisation and 
in principle can only be dedicated to the organisation’s mission. 
 
Non-for-profit (NFP) organisations: private organisations that are characterised by (i) their non-distribution-constraint 
and (ii) the absence of owners.  
 
Ideally, the non-distribution-constraint of NFPs acts as a plain signal to potential providers of 
donated labour. When profits are prohibited, firms can credibly commit to public goals, thus 
attracting workers that support these goals as well. In practice, however, the interaction between 
the non-profit status and donated labour is nontrivial. NFPs often have problems in formulating 
concrete missions, or worse, its management may be inclined to exploit the incontractability of 
their activities.
6 Stated differently, the formal restriction on the appropriation of profits is a 
necessary, but not a sufficient condition to favour the beneficiary stakeholders. Instead of 
improving the quality and accessibility of services, the management and workers of NFPs may 
 
5 In contrast, Francois (2002) argues that labour donation mechanisms may be hampered by workers that want to free-ride 
on the effort of their co-workers, anticipating that they are willing to donate labour in their place. NFPs may combat this 
problem by offering higher (‘efficiency’) wages, thus reducing such moral hazard problems.  
6 Obviously, FP organisations may also have problems in formulating concrete missions, and act accordingly. In this 
process, however, they will experience the pressure from their residual claimants.   20 
use other mechanisms for their own interest, for instance by increasing wages or decreasing the 
number of working hours. We return to this issue, and other potential, related inefficiencies in 
more detail in Section 3.3. 
2.3  NFPs as failure correcting devices 
In the literature, there is a variety of market failures providing an opportunity for NFPs to 
outperform FPs. In the following, we list four of them that are most prevalent in explaining the 
rationale of NFPs: (i) asymmetric information, (ii) externalities, (iii) market power and (iv) 
distributional or merit good concerns.
7 In this list, distributional and merit good arguments can 
be labelled as equity concerns, which therefore would not be characterised as market failures in 
a narrow sense (i.e. an efficiency argument). For all market failures, we do not only assess their 
importance, but also whether there is a potentially strong role for NFPs as well.  
Asymmetric information and agency problems 
The delivery of services often comes with substantial so called ‘moral hazard’ problems: as 
many quality aspects are hard to observe by consumers, producers may be inclined to reduce the 
quality of their services. In the literature, the moral hazard argument, or ‘contractual failure’, is 
often mentioned as the major rationale for NFPs (see e.g. Hansman, 1980). Particularly in the 
social services sector, doctors, nurses, case-managers and nursery school teachers are better 
informed on the quality of services they provide than consumers. Thus, the non profit status 
may act as a signal that service providers will not exploit their informational advantage and act 
in the interest of consumers. Generally, the long term consequences of service interventions are 
hard to measure and contract upon ─ in particular the future effects on health (hospitals), 
cognitive and social skills (child care) and the durability of new jobs (WTW). Related to this, it 
is difficult to determine the net effect of service providers, that is, the extent to which they 
influence outcome variables, or factors that are beyond their reach. This is particularly relevant 
to the WTW-sector. Here, re-employment rates are driven by a variety of factors that WTW-
firms cannot control ─ for instance the business cycle. 
 
Asymmetric information problems may not only result in quality problems, but also limit the 
accessibility of services. Such mechanisms ─ which in the literature are referred to as ‘adverse 
selection problems’ ─ typically occur in the insurance and lending industry, where insurers and 
bankers are, to a large extent, unable to differentiate between the individual risks of consumers. 
Given a certain premium rate, only high risk individuals are likely to buy insurance. Thus, 
insurance may not be profitable, leading to underinsurance. Within the context of the three 
cases of interest, adverse selection is particularly important in the care sector, where insurers 
 
7 In the literature, the (quasi-) public good argument is often mentioned as one of the key market failures. Within the context 
of (social) services, however, this argument is not relevant.   21 
bear the individual health risk of consumers. Without any intervention, the market is likely to 
lead to underinsurance against health costs. NFPs however have limited power to counteract the 
adverse selection problem fundamentally; attracting ‘bad risks’ only would be too costly to 
survive. Instead, adverse selection problems here call for a regulatory role for the public sector 
─ for instance by establishing a universal acceptance obligation for insurers. Obviously, NFPs 
still may in fact aim at improving the (financial) access to health services for specific target 
groups, but this argument mostly stems from equity concerns, rather than efficiency arguments. 
 
Asymmetric information often coincides with so called ‘agency problems’: consumers are often 
not the actual decision maker in buying services, and public sector representatives do not have 
strong incentives to keep expenses low or to provide sufficiently high quality. In the 
Netherlands, WTW services are at the cost of the social benefit administration. Within this 
setting, consumers often have limited capacity for choice and are not the actual decision-maker. 
Instead, it may be that health insurers or case-managers decide upon the costs and type of 
services that are provided. This reduces the information asymmetry vis-à-vis service providers, 
but publicly financing social services may also result in ‘agency problems’, implying that 
consumers and public sector representatives do not have strong incentives to keep expenses low 
or to provide sufficiently high quality. Thus, agency problems may magnify moral hazard 
problems or result in lower efficiency. NFPs may instead be less inclined to take advantage of 
agency problems than FP organisations. 
Externalities 
The production and consumption of products may have unintended consequences on parties 
other than the consumer that cannot be reflected in individual prices. With respect to the social 
services sector, these so called externalities are mostly positive, in the sense that the provision 
of services does not only benefit the individual consumer, but also other individuals. Similar to 
public organisations, positive externalities may be a rationale for NFP organisations to exist. 
That is, NFPs may facilitate managers or workers that are intrinsically motivated to internalise 
externalities. 
 
When regarding the three cases externalities may form a rationale for NFP provision for WTW 
services in particular. If WTW trajectories indeed reduce unemployment levels, this may lead to 
a reduction in crime. The evidence suggests that labour market programmes for the unemployed 
may be effective for some types of instruments and for particular types of individuals. 
Generally, job counselling and monitoring are instruments that are found to be cost-effective.
8 
Additionally, there is a growing body of literature that addresses the effects of unemployment 
 
8 See De Mooij et al (2006) for a recent survey on the effectiveness of WTW activities.   22 
on crime and nuisance. At present, there is consensus that unemployment indeed causes crime 
and nuisance to increase, but not on the order of magnitude (e.g. Raphael et al., 2001).
9  
 
For the childcare sector, various studies do find a positive relation between the quality of 
childcare and the cognitive and social development of the child (Blau and Currie; 2004). This 
however does not necessarily point at externalities, as it may be that similar outcomes are 
achieved when children are raised at home. The case for tax externalities seems much stronger, 
i.e. the use of child care is commonly accompanied by additional labour supply, thus increasing 
tax revenues. Still, this is not a sufficient argument for (local) NFPs, as these tax revenues 
accrue to the national level. Thus, tax externalities can be used as an argument for child care tax 
subsidies at the national level as well. 
 
For hospitals, a similar line of reasoning applies: externalities may exist, but there is no 
apparent role for NFPs here. Typically, externalities of hospital services occur when diseases 
are infectious. By curing or preventing infectious diseases, these benefits do not exclusively 
accrue to the individual patient. The presence of such externalities may be an argument to 
subsidise various treatments or medicines. In modern Western countries, however, this role is 
usually taken care of by the public sector.  
Market power 
Firms may derive market power from scale advantages, for instance when local markets where 
they operate are characterised by regional monopolies. In principle, NFPs are less likely to 
exploit market power by raising prices and reducing the delivery of services than FPs are. As a 
result, market power as a rationale for NFPs ─ particularly in small and isolated communities ─ 
is connected to the distributional concerns argument. This holds for both the provision of child 
care and hospitals. For WTW-services, the market power argument is less strong, as scale 
advantages are far less important here (see e.g. CPB, 2000).  
Distributional concerns 
NFPs are often driven by a mixture of distributional and paternalistic concerns. NFPs may aim 
at a sufficient (physical or financial) access to services or a minimum provision of services for 
all consumers under all circumstances (i.e. health care). This means that NFPs focus on the 
provision of services in specific (isolated) areas and for specific target groups. In contrast to 
FPs, NFP organisations may have less incentives to “cream-skim” the most profitable 
consumers or activities. For instance, NFPs may provide reasonably priced child care or health 
facilities for low income families. Similarly, NFPs may help unemployed workers with bad 
 
9 Raphael and Winter-Ebmer (2001) argue that a substantial portion of the reduction of property crime during the 1990s in 
the US is attributable to a decline in the unemployment rate. For violent crime, the evidence is considerably weaker.   23 
labour market prospects. Note that these arguments may also be a reason for public sector 
intervention (i.e. general tax allowances), thus reducing the scope for NFPs.  
2.4  Summing up 
Table 2.1 summarises the main market failures that may or may not be used as a rationale for 
NFPs. In the table, we first address the importance of failures (indicated by “+”) for the various 
sectors. Second, we address the question whether NFPs may have a specific advantage 
compared to public sector organisations, particularly in organising and attracting donated labour 
and donations at the local level. We indicate this by an additional “+”. 
 
Table 2.2  Most relevant market failures for three cases
a 
  Child care  Hospitals  Welfare-to-work 
       
Asymmetric information and agency problems  ++  ++  ++ 
Externalities  +  +  ++ 
Market power  ++  ++  0 
Distributional concerns  ++  ++  ++ 
       
a “+” indicates market failures; “++” indicates market failures as a (strong) rationale for NFP intervention 
  
Table 2.1 makes apparent that the three sectors are all subject to information problems, which 
may be aggravated by agency problems, in particular in the hospital and WTW sector. Thus, 
NFPs can make a difference here vis-à-vis FPs by acting (more) in the interest of their 
consumers and providing better quality on aspects of that are hard to observe. Externalities may 
also be a rationale for NFP intervention in the three social services sectors. This rationale is 
strongest for the WTW-sector, where the benefits of such intervention accrue to the local level. 
Finally, distributional concerns and ─ related to this ─ market power of service providers may 
be an argument for NFP intervention, particularly when the role of public sector intervention as 
a redistribution device is limited or market power of FP organisations would be too strong 
otherwise.    24 
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3  Step (2): Do non-profits make a difference? 
3.1  From market failures to performance indicators 
In the previous section, we have argued that four market failures can be used as a rationale for 
NFPs to exist: informational asymmetries, externalities, market power and distributional 
concerns. These market failures provide NFPs with the opportunity to make a difference vis-à-
vis FPs. Within this context, “making a difference” implies that NFPs may outperform FPs on 
some aspects: costs and efficiency, quality, quantity (accessibility), or its focus on specific 
consumers or (local) market segments.  
 
Table 3.1 presents the connection between the market failures and performance indicators. The 
table makes apparent that performance differentials between NFPs and FPs can mostly be 
linked to more than one market failure, and inversely: 
 
Table 3.1  From relevant market failures to performance indicators 
  Efficiency  Quality  Accessibility  Focus on specific 
consumer types 
Focus on specific market 
segments 
           
Asymmetric information    ×  ×     
Positive externalities  ×    ×     
Distributional concerns        x  × 
Market power  ×  ×  ×    × 
 
First, information asymmetries may cause a reduction in quality aspects that are hard to 
observe. In principle, consumers would have been willing to pay higher prices for services of 
higher quality, but information asymmetries hinder this process, thus causing welfare to be 
lower. NFPs may counteract this by providing a higher level of quality.
10 Second, positive 
externalities result in prices that ─ at the societal (welfare) level ─ are too high, and a number 
of delivered services that is too low. The conventional way to combat this problem is by 
subsidising the production of services. As NFPs have a non-profit condition, they can use rents 
to ‘subsidise’ the production of services as well, by keeping prices low and maximising 
quantities, rather than profits. Third, distributional concerns deal mostly with the provision of 
services to low income families, or market segments where the provision of services is limited. 
NFPs may thus give priority to specific income groups, or set up firms in specific market 
segments. Fourth, and related to this, in markets where FPs have substantial market power, 
production, efficiency and quality may be non-optimal ─ or, stated differently, in a standard 
competitive market consumers would have benefited from a higher level of utility of these 
 
10 Note that we abstract from adverse selection problems as a rationale for NFP intervention here. As we have argued in the 
previous section, public sector regulation is needed for adverse selection problems to be solved fundamentally   26 
services. Overall, NFPs in principle may outperform FPs on almost all relevant performance 
indicators: quality, prices, and the provision of services in particular areas. 
 
Static and dynamic efficiency 
In the framework we propose, the efficiency of services is more or less implicitly defined as ‘value for money’ ─ i.e. the 
quality  level  that  consumers  want  is  provided  at  minimal  costs.  This  definition  is  commonly  referred  to  as  ‘static 
efficiency’. Within this context, ‘dynamic efficiency’ relates to the activities of employers to invest in the future quality and 
efficiency of services.  
 
Investments in the future quality of services may hamper static efficiency, at the benefit of dynamic efficiency ─ the 
management (both of FP and NFP organisations) has to achieve the right combination of static and dynamic efficiency, 
so  as to  provide  an  optimal  efficiency  level. When  assuming steady  state  outcomes  of this  process, comparisons 
between FPs and NFPs can be based on quality and cost levels, as the underlying combination of static and dynamic 
efficiency levels is then irrelevant. 
 
Combining these outcome indicators, NFPs can have various mission statements ─ “providing 
quality”, “helping the disadvantaged”, or “enhancing the production of services” ─ and aim at 
making a difference on these aspects vis-à-vis FPs. Here, providing better quality mostly stems 
from asymmetric information problems, whereas accessibility ─ i.e. low prices, higher 
quantities, particularly for target groups ─ is mostly associated with externalities, market power 
and distribution concerns as relevant market failures. In order to make a difference, NFPs have 
to have rents at their disposal, and subsequently use these to the wellbeing of their consumers. 
Such rents may basically originate from three sources: private donations, donated labour and tax 
exemptions.  
 
In what follows, we survey the empirical literature that addresses that relative performance  
of NFPs: do they actually make a difference? In particular, we link the various market failures 
discussed in the previous section to specific performance indicators. So far, the literature on the 
relative performance of NFPs seems limited to the US and Canada. In our survey, we therefore 
restrict most of our attention to these countries.  
 
3.2  Do NFPs make a difference? 
3.2.1  Hospitals 
The hospital industry is subject to many market failures. As we discussed in the previous 
section, there are three relevant market failures here that may be particularly relevant for the 
mission of NFPs: (i) asymmetric information; (ii) distributional concerns; and (iii) market 
power. First, hospital services are subject to informational asymmetry: patients cannot judge the 
quality of the services that are provided, which reduces the incentives of hospitals to produce 
high quality. These moral hazard problems may be aggravated by agency problems ─ that is,    27 
the patient has limited capacity for choice since he is often not the actual decision-maker, 
resulting in low incentives for hospitals to provide high-quality care and inefficiencies. Second, 
distributional concerns mostly boil down to the issue of accessibility of care. Third, since 
hospitals often have a regional monopoly, they may exploit market power, causing prices too 
become too high and the provision of services too low. 
 
There is a large literature in the US that addresses the difference in quality between FP and NFP 
hospitals, mostly in terms of their mortality rates.
11 Overall, there appears to be no systematic 
difference in quality. Recently, Eggleston et al. (2006) have identified various factors that 
explain the diversity of results that are found in the literature.
12 First, the unit of analysis is 
important: studies using data at patient level generally find no differences between the quality 
of FP and NFP, while studies using aggregated data at the hospital level generally find that NFP 
perform better. Second, quality differentials between FP and NFP hospitals are strongly related 
to the period of investigation. In particular, after 1990 authors generally find no differentials 
between the organisation types. Eggleston et al. (2006) argue that this result stems from a recent 
convergence among ownership forms, and better controls for unobserved heterogeneity in 
patients. They also stress that recent studies take better account of the role of competition. That 
is, increases in competition between hospitals of the last decades may well explain the 
convergence between FP and NFP hospitals.  
Regarding cream-skimming and access to care, the evidence is mixed. Here, most of the 
literature falls down to the question of whether FP and NFP hospitals pursue objectives that 
differ from profit maximisation. If NFP hospitals effectively aim to maximise profits, they will 
tend to drop non-profitable services and cream-skim the most profitable patients, similar to FP 
hospitals. Sloan (2000) analyses hospital conversions in three US states. He finds that switching 
from the NFP to the FP status has decreased the probability that a hospital runs potentially 
unprofitable programs, like AIDS prevention, community health, and rehabilitation programs. 
This study, however, suffers from substantial selection effects, i.e. hospitals that converted to 
FP organisations are likely to be hospitals with poor financial performance in the first place. 
Cutler and Horwitz (2000), who also address conversions from NFP to FP hospitals, find that 
“having FP hospitals in the market appears to cause NFP hospitals to adopt the same 
moneymaking measures employed by FP hospitals”. Duggan (2000) analyses the response of 
FP and NFP hospitals to financial incentives, induced by a policy change aiming at improving 
quality of care for the poor. He finds no difference: both cream-skimmed patients by avoiding 
 
11 Studies that find the quality of NFP hospitals to outperform that of FP hospitals are: Outler and Horowitz (2000), Sloan et 
al. (1999), Gray and McKerney (1986). Reverse results are found in McClellan and Staiger (2000) and Marmor et al. (1986). 
12 Another meta-analysis has been done by Devereaux et al. (2002). They looked at 15 studies involving more than 26000 
hospitals. They find that FP hospitals were associated with increased risk of death, suggesting that NFP hospitals perform 
better than FP hospitals. This study has been, however, severely criticised by Eggleston et al. (2006); they argue that the 
studies used overlapping data from the same patients and same hospitals.    28 
Medicaid and uninsured patients and both used the extra revenues to increase their financial 
assets, not to improve quality of care. By contrast, Horwitz (2005) finds that both types of 
hospitals pursue different objectives and that FP hospitals are more profit-seeking than either 
NFP or public hospitals. When combining the insights from various studies, it appears that the 
accessibility of services provided is driven by competition in markets: both NFP and FP 
hospitals are more likely to offer profitable services and less likely to offer unprofitable services 
when competition is high. Still, when competition is low, NFP may make a difference by 
providing services for uninsured patients (see Dijkgraaf et al., 2006).  
Overall, the picture that emerges is that NFP hospitals do not make a systematic difference vis-
à-vis FP hospitals. It is only in markets with relatively low competition that NFPs may provide 
a higher level of accessibility of services, particularly for uninsured patients.  
3.2.2  Child care 
Information asymmetries in the childcare sector are a natural consequence of the fact that the 
primary recipients of the service are young children who often lack the cognitive skills to fully 
assess and communicate shortcomings in quality. Parents will gather information about the 
quality of services through various channels (i.e. the behaviour of their child, the reputation of 
the childcare provider and visits to the childcare facility). Still, as they simply cannot be 
physically present when the service is rendered, a residual information asymmetry will always 
remain. Childcare providers may therefore have an incentive to exert less effort on quality, 
especially on those aspects of quality that are hard to observe. The pivotal question is whether 
the non-distribution constraint shields NFPs from this inclination to shirk. Similarly, as we also 
argued in the previous section, NFPs may be more inclined to provide child care in isolated 
markets or to less affluent consumers. Childcare suffers from the danger that, as quality comes 
at a cost and parents face liquidity constraints, social stratification in childcare might occur, 
with children from high-income families receiving high quality childcare and children from 
low-income families receiving low-quality care.  
 
For the child care sector, the empirical literature distinguishes three aspects of quality: (i) 
structural quality, which concerns the basic quality of the childcare environment (e.g. 
furnishings, fire safety and group size); (ii) process quality, relating to the service itself, i.e. 
teacher-child and peer interactions; and (iii) quality in child outcomes, i.e. the contribution of 
childcare to the emotional, social and cognitive development of the child. Structural quality is 
generally easy to observe (and regulate!). Empirical studies mostly find that NFPs on average 
provide a higher level of structural quality (Mocan (1995), Sundell (2000) and Cleveland and 
Krashinsky (2004, 2005)). Obviously, process quality of childcare services is more difficult to 
observe than structural quality, and therefore the NFP advantage should theoretically be larger   29 
here. The evidence here is however more mixed.
13 Whereas Canadian studies tend to report a 
significant positive NFP differential (Cleveland and Krashinsky (2004); Japel et al. (2005)), the 
most recent and comprehensive US studies do not (Morris and Helburn (2000), Blau and Mocan 
(2002)). The degree of regulation may be important in determining the extent to which NFPs 
and FPs can behave differently. In particular, Morris and Helburn (2000) and Blau and Mocan 
(2002) find a positive NFP differential only in the state with the least stringent regulatory 
framework. Also market size seems of importance here: Cleveland and Krashinsky (2005) find 
that a NFP advantage only materialises in markets with sufficiently high demand. Presumably, 
in (homogeneous) markets with low demand, NFPs are forced to compete with FPs on price, 
limiting their ability to offer higher quality (at higher costs). Finally, the third aspect of 
childcare quality, i.e. quality in child outcomes, is most difficult to observe, as the effect of high 
quality childcare on child development may take considerable time to materialize and is 
difficult to measure. Sundell (2000) finds no significant differences in child outcomes between 
NFP and FP childcare providers. Overall, the empirical results on a NFP advantage in providing 
high-quality childcare are rather ambiguous.  
 
Distributional concerns also feature in the market for childcare. Most studies indeed find that 
NFP childcare organisations are on average more likely to serve low-income families 
(Krashinsky (2005), Whitebook et al. (1990), Morris and Helburn (2000) and Blau and Mocan 
(2002)). Whitebook et al. (1990), however, find that the relation between family income and 
mode of childcare provision is not straightforward ─ i.e. linear. While children from low-
income families are more likely to attend NFP childcare centres than children from middle-
income families, the same holds true for children from high-income families. High-income 
families in the sample were most likely attracted by the higher average quality offered in the 
NFP centres. Oddly, both high-income and low-income families displayed a higher willingness-
to-pay than middle-income families. The only study to dissent is Japel et al. (2005). They find 
that children with a less favourable socio-economic background are more likely to attend FP(!) 
daycare centres. In addition, they find that while in FP centres the quality of service varies with 
the socio-economic status of its clientele (i.e. children from low-income families received the 
lowest quality of care), this phenomenon does not occur in NFP centres. This last observation 
again lends credence to the idea that NFPs are less likely to compromise on quality when faced 
with a less affluent clientele.  
 
 
13 Quality that is hard to observe, is naturally also hard to measure. In order to compare levels of process quality, 
economists use a scale that was designed by child psychologist, which measures the level of various aspects of quality 
during onsite visits by professional observers called the Early Childhood Environment Raring Scale (ECERS) or Infant- and 
Toddler Environment Rating Scale (ICERS).   30 
Do NFP organisations (still) make a difference in the Dutch childcare market? 
NFP and FP childcare providers do not always compete on a level playing field. Prior to the introduction of the 2005 
Childcare  Act,  municipalities  played  an  important  role  in  shaping  the  local  childcare  provision  through  subsidy 
relationships with predominantly NFP organisations. The 2005 Childcare Act ended these relationships. Under the new 
regime, the provision of childcare is determined by demand factors only, i.e. childcare vouchers for parents, thereby 
creating a (more) level playing field for NFP and FP childcare providers. 
 
Noailly et al (2007) compare the provision of childcare under the old regime (in the period 1999-2001) with the provision 
of childcare after the introduction of the 2005 Childcare Act (in 2006). They observe the following developments: 
 
•  Compared to the period 1999-2001, the provision of childcare in 2006 has shifted towards areas with 
higher purchasing power and away from less urbanised areas. 
•  In 2006, FPs account for a larger number and share of all childcare facilities. 
•  The fall in the provision of childcare by NFP facilities has been especially pronounced in areas that had no FP 
childcare provision prior to the regime change. 
 
The last development suggests that the difference between FP and NFP providers is small: in the absence of the 
municipal  subsidies,  NFPs  do  not  appear  to  have  an  advantage  as  they  are  no  longer  viable  in  areas  that  have 
insufficient demand. Related to this, NFP organisations no longer seem to make a (substantial) difference compared to 
FPs by operating in areas with lower income groups and less urbanised areas. 
 
Obviously,  for  a  full  comparison  of  the  behaviour  and  performance  of  FP  and  NFP  childcare  providers  in  the 
Netherlands it is essential to analyse whether they provide the same quality of service at the same prices. So far, this 
information is not necessarily publicly available. 
 
Summarizing, there is no clear systematic evidence in the empirical literature that NFP 
childcare providers are more trustworthy in producing high quality childcare. Remarkably, the 
only difference between FP and NFP providers that emerges from the literature regards aspects 
of quality that are easy to observe and regulate. As in the case of hospitals, direct competition 
between NFPs and FPs inhibits the extent to which the two organisational forms may behave 
differently. With respect to differentiation or accessibility of care, there are some indications 
that NFP are more willing to service low-income markets. 
3.2.3  Welfare-to-work 
Similar to the health care and child care sector, information asymmetries are probably the most 
important market failure in the WTW-sector. In most OECD countries, the public sector is the 
major customer of WTW-services, aiming at getting benefit recipients back to work. Here, the 
key question is how the government can protect the collective interest when private 
organisations take care of WTW activities. The non-profit-condition may be one way to ensure: 
(i) WTW activities to result in durable jobs, and (ii) WTW organisations not to cream skim 
unemployed clients with a priori good prospects of finding work. First, the durability of jobs is 
of particular interest for society as a whole, as benefit savings are to be discounted over a   31 
sufficiently long time horizon. Second, cream skimming is inefficient when WTW trajectories 
are useful for disadvantaged workers, but the effort on this group is minimised. Opposition to 
cream skimming may also come from equity grounds: irrespective of the (net) efficiency gains 
or losses of WTW activities, NFPs may argue that priority should be given to disadvantaged 
workers. Thus, cream skimming and distributional concerns are closely related within the 
context of WTW services, and therefore should be treated jointly. 
 
If NFPs make a difference on the quality of services vis-à-vis FP organisations, we would 
expect the net effectiveness of NFPs to be higher ─ that is, WTW-services should result in 
higher re-employment rates or higher wages at placement. So far, there is little empirical 
evidence that specifically addresses this issue, with Heinrich (2000) and Stoll et al. (2003) as 
major exceptions. Heinrich (2000) studies the effectiveness of 637 local service providers of 
JTPA
14-activities in the US over the period 1994-1994. These service providers can be 
classified as public non-profits (14%), private non-profits (65%) and for-profits (21%). When 
comparing the outcome variables ─ wages, job placements ─ no systematic differences between 
organisation types are found. In the short run, at the moment of termination of a program, FPs 
seem to outperform NFPs, but these differences do not last when considering the first post-
program quarters. Stoll et al. (2002) study the outcomes of ‘Community Based Organisations’ 
(CBO’s) ─ a specific type of NFPs that is relatively strongly rooted in local areas ─ in the 
Boston area of the US. In this study, CBO’s seem to perform better than other NFPs and FP 
organisations in terms of job placement rates. In terms of placement wages, however, CBO’s 
perform less. We therefore conclude that in the US, NFPs are not consistently more effective or 
ineffective than FP organisations. 
 
The second argument for NFPs may be rooted in cream skimming. Heckman et al. (2002) 
analyse cream skimming in WTW services in great detail. They argue that it is associated with 
modest efficiency gains or losses only.
15 This means that combating cream skimming must 
come from distributional concerns. Heinrich (2000) however does not find any systematic 
differences between organisation types here: for instance, in the period of investigation, FP 
organisations were more likely to serve welfare recipients, clients with basic skills deficiencies, 
but less likely to serve high-school dropouts. In addition, FPs were even somewhat more likely 
to provide more intensive types of training services to participants. In contrast, Stoll et al. 
(2002) do find evidence that CBO’s in Boston train participants with more ‘barrier 
characteristics’ than other. Still, one may argue that these CBO’s are not representative for 
NFPs in general.   
 
 
14 Job Training Partnership Act. As of 1998, the JTPA has been replaced by the Workforce Investment Act (WIA). 
15 See also Koning (2005) for a discussion on the importance of cream skimming in the provision of WTW-services.    32 
From these findings, we may conclude that NFP WTW-providers do not systematically make a 
difference to FP organisations, or public offices. Still, NFPs are often favoured in contracting 
processes (Heinrich, 1999). Moreover, NFP organisations may receive tax-deductible donations 
and are often exempt for local property and sales taxes. Generally, it seems NFPs cannot 
effectively use these advantages by favouring their clients, or specific groups of workers. 
3.3  Rents and rent extraction 
When combining the insights from the empirical literature, the picture emerges that NFPs do 
not systematically make a difference with respect to FP social service organisations. It is only in 
specific circumstances and for specific services that NFPs serve different market segments or 
provide services with higher quality. In particular, for the three markets under investigation, we 
only find some evidence for a wider accessibility of services for specific groups and higher 
quality when regulatory measures by the public sector are virtually absent or when competition 
is low.  
 
In order to interpret these results, our primary interest lies in the non-profit-condition of NFPs. 
In particular, the empirical results can be interpreted in two ways: (i) NFPs do not attract a 
substantial amount of donated labour; or (ii) (ex ante) rents of NFPs are lost by managerial 
inefficiencies (‘rent extraction’). Both explanations may be interrelated: if NFPs are susceptive 
to inefficiencies, individuals may be less willing to donate labour. Particularly when 
inefficiencies are associated with vague missions, high wages or extensive emoluments, the 
provision of donated labour becomes discouraged. In practice, the efficiency of NFPs can be 
hampered by the relatively strong position of its management and workers, as they lack the 
control of shareholders (‘managerial shirking’). NFPs often operate in markets where quality is 
hard to measure, and mission statements hard to define. In contrast, FP organisations have one 
goal that is undisputed: the maximisation of profits. Also, the dynamic efficiency of NFPs ─ i.e. 
their capacity to attract capital for innovations ─ is hampered by the absence of shareholders. In 
contrast to FP organisations, NFP organisations rely upon donations and private equity only, 
thus limiting their ability to attract new capital (Gradus and Bovenberg, 2001).  
 
Basically, there are three ways to empirically expose possible inefficiencies or rents extraction 
in NFP organisations: (i) the analysis of wage differentials; (ii) comparing costs and efficiency 
measures in general; and (iii) analysing the response of NFPs to changes in competition. We 
now discuss the evidence on these three items. 
(i) Wage differentials 
Compared to FP organisations, NFPs may have an advantage in attracting donated labour. In its 
most extreme form, NFPs employ voluntary workers, thereby reducing their (labour) costs   33 
substantially. When workers expect the organisation not to extract the surplus that is associated 
with lower wage costs, they may accept lower wages than in a FP setting. There is however 
another specific feature of NFPs with opposite effects: as NFP organisations lack the control of 
shareholders, its management and workers may be tempted to increase wages. Thus, the 
theoretical net impact on wages is ambiguous.  
 
When considering the social services sectors, wage comparisons between FP and NFP 
organisations are mostly directed towards hospitals and child care organisations. Ruhm and 
Borkoski (2000) find FP hospital workers to have similar wages as NFP hospital workers. In 
contrast, Roomkin and Weisbrod (1997) do find differences between the two types of 
organisations, but this concerns the relative importance of fixed and performance related pay, 
rather than the total wage sum that is paid. In the child care sector, the vast majority of studies 
suggests that, after controlling for job and education types, wages are higher in the NFP sector 
(Mocan, 1995; Mocan en Terkin, 2000; Blau en Mocan, 2002; and Cleveland en Krashinsky, 
2004). Cleveland and Krashinsky (2004), however, argue that the NFP wage premium can be 
explained by higher quality of services provided. This means that workers in NFP organisations 
provide a higher quality of services, which is rewarded by higher wages. In a way, this is 
surprising: it suggests that NFP workers ─ similar to workers in FP organisations ─ are driven 
by financial incentives. 
 
So far, the literature shows no convincing evidence that NFP wages are systematically lower 
than in FP organisations. Instead, it seems that NFP organisations are equally susceptive to rent 
extraction.   
(ii) Costs and efficiency  
Similar to wage payments, cost and efficiency measures can be informative on the rents and 
rents extraction of NFP organisations. In particular, lower cost levels and high efficiency levels 
point towards higher rents ─ particularly as a result of donated labour ─ whereas the opposite 
suggests rents extraction to be dominant. For the care sector, there is an extensive literature that 
addresses the efficiency of hospitals. In a recent meta-study, Shen et al. (2005) review this 
literature as from 1990. They argue that sufficient controls at the level of patients, hospitals and 
market characteristics are needed for a fair comparison between NFP and FP organisations. In 
such a setting, little differences between the organisation types are found. Similarly, Mocan 
(1995) and Blau en Mocan (2002) find no cost or efficiency differentials in the child care 
sector. Therefore, again the picture emerges that FP and NFP organisations are not that different 
after all.   34 
(iii) Market conduct and competition 
In markets with limited competition, FP organisations have the opportunity to extract rents by 
raising prices and (thus) lowering the quantities of services that are provided. As we argued in 
the previous section, NFP organisations may counteract this by not exploiting their market 
power, but acting in the interest of consumers. One way to test for this is by relating FP-NFP 
differences to the extent of competition in particular markets ─ that is, to assess the response of 
NFP and FP organisations to changes in the level of competition. Suppose for instance that 
there is a merger between large service providers. Then, the question is whether FPs and NFPs 
do (or do not) exploit the rents that come with this merger. Empirical research on this question 
has been initiated by Lynk (1995), who analysed a merger between the two largest NFP 
hospitals in Grand Rapids, Michigan. Lynk used a conceptual model to argue that the 
‘cooperative’ board of directors would not raise prices. Melnick et al. (1999) however find 
ownership status not to influence pricing responses of merging hospitals. Consistent with this, 
Dranove and Ludwick (1999), Keeler et al. (1999) and Simpson and Shin (1997) all find that 
NFP and FP hospitals set higher prices in less concentrated markets. Thus, the evidence seems 
to favour the idea that FP and NFP hospitals are both susceptive to rents extraction.
16 Hansmann 
(1996) even characterises the non-profit form as “largely anachronistic” in the hospital industry, 
with the large share of NFP hospitals to be attributable mainly to capital embeddedness.
17 
 
For the other two sectors under investigation, the evidence on the conduct of FP and NFP 
organisations is much thinner. Heinrich (2000) finds both types of WTW organisations to 
respond equally to incentive schemes ─ that is, both FP and NFP organisations in the US 
showed a similar increase in re-employment rates when performance incentives in service 
provider contracts were included. This suggests that moral hazard problems are equally 
important for the two organisation types; without such incentives, FP organisations do not 
exploit this more than NFPs. James and Rose-Ackerman (1986) and Rose-Ackerman (1996) 
also doubt NFPs to be dissimilar: NFP organisations are not viewed as more trustworthy, and 
are equally or even more susceptive to internal agency problems. Moreover, often consumers 
cannot distinguish the organisational form itself.  
3.4  Interaction and spill-overs 
Until now, we have argued that ─ when regarding the three social services sectors ─ NFPs do 
not systematically seem to make a difference on various performance outcomes. Loosely 
 
16 In a broader study, David (2005) argues that FP and NFP hospitals have largely converged, particularly regarding the size 
of both types of organisations.  
17 There is also no evidence that the management of NFP hospitals follows explicit objectives of caring for non-profitable 
patients. Mistead (1999) finds most compensation plans for executives of NFP health care organizations not to include goals 
or provision for providing community benefits. Brickley and Van Horn (2003) find no evidence that NFP hospitals provide 
explicit incentives for their CEOs to focus on altruistic activities.    35 
speaking, this finding is mirrored by the evidence for rents extraction. Presumably, NFP 
workers offer more donated labour than in a FP setting, but this does not necessarily translate 
into lower wages, higher efficiency, or other different responses with respect to changes in 
competition. In this sense, Hansmann (1996) even characterises the status difference as “largely 
anachronistic”.  
 
The observation that FP and NFP organisations do not have different conduct or performance 
outcomes can be used as an argument not to stimulate NFP organisations. This line of 
reasoning, relies upon the implicit assumption that the conduct and performance of FP (NFP) 
organisations is not affected by the presence of NFP (FP) organisations. Or, stated differently, 
that there is no interaction between the two organisational forms. If however quality effects 
spill-over from NFP to FP organisations ─ that is, FP organisations increase their quality in 
response to the presence of NFP organisations ─ this may be welfare improving. At first sight, 
quality differences may then be small or even negligible, but the mere presence of NFPs raises 
the overall level of quality in a particular market. 
 
Interaction effects between the two organisational forms have received relatively little academic 
interest. One exception that focuses on mixed markets in which NFPs and FPs coexist, is the 
analysis by Grabowski and Hirth (2001). These authors test two alternative hypotheses on the 
effect of NFPs on their for-profit counterparts in the nursing home sector. The first hypothesis is 
that FP en NFP organisations operate in different market segments, thus ruling out any spill-
over effects. The second hypothesis is that positive spill-over effects occur, basically as a result 
of heterogeneity among customer types ─ that is, some are more or less informed on the quality 
of services than others are.  
 
The first hypothesis of Grabowksi and Hirth is that NFP organisations focus on the high quality 
segment of the market, while leaving lower quality segments of the market to their FP 
competitors. The argument for this would be that NFP organisations have a competitive 
advantage over FPs in delivering high quality. This advantage may originate from a managerial 
preference for higher quality, as well as a staff that values providing high quality and is willing 
to donate labour to this end. Thus, the effective costs in this market segment can be lowered 
below the costs of pure profit maximisers. This picture ties in with the analysis of Lakdawalla 
and Phillipson (2005), who argue that firms with objectives that differ from profit 
maximisation, such as a preference for high output or high quality (altruism), may be 
interpreted as benefiting from reduced marginal costs. Such ‘profit-deviators’ will enjoy a 
competitive advantage over for-profit firms, since their altruism makes them willing to sell at a 
lower price. Now, if consumers are sufficiently capable of recognising quality, and value it 
accordingly, NFPs will dominate the higher segment of the market and crowd out FPs. 
Conversely, in the low quality segment where donated labour will be less prevalent, FPs will   36 
dominate. Thus, it is basically the amount of donated labour that raises the average quality level 
in mixed markets. This means that spill-over effects are absent. 
 
The alternative hypothesis analysed by Hirth and Grabowski is that there are quality spill-overs 
from NFPs to FPs. Here, the key argument is that some consumers are worse informed on 
quality that others. In a purely FP market, higher shares of ill-informed, quality- unresponsive 
consumers provide higher incentives to shirk on quality. We have argued earlier that the non-
distribution constraint, conversely, allows NFP organisations to credibly commit to high 
quality. As a result, ill-informed consumers are most likely to be drawn towards the NFP 
organisations, relying on the fact that their informational disadvantage will not be exploited 
here. This in turn lowers the share of poorly informed consumers that remain for the FP sector. 
Due to this composition effect, the penalty on quality shirking increases, thus resulting in higher 
quality of FP organisations as well. In this sense, such effects can be labelled as spill-overs.  
 
With respect to quality of nursing homes, Hirth and Grabowski find no evidence for the first 
hypothesis, where a higher NFP market share would lead to concentration of FP in the lower 
quality segments (i.e. market segmentations). In contrast, they find quality in FP nursing homes 
to be positively related to the market share of NFPs, which confirms the spill-over hypothesis. 
Still, similar results are not obtained for the overall quality level in markets, whereas Spector et 
al. (1998), also focussing on the nursing home industry, find no support for any spill-over 
effects. Overall, we thus may conclude that the evidence for spill-over effects from NFP to FP 
organisations is inconclusive.  
 
We have argued earlier that spill-over effects can be welfare-improving. The question therefore 
arises whether ─ if such effects are important ─ this calls for any government intervention. In 
particular, one may argue that subsidising NFP organisations increases the share of NFP 
organisations, thus giving greater pressure to FP organisations to increase quality. Still, such 
policies are not likely to be well targeted to increase quality. Here, the main reason is that the 
amount of donated labour within a particular market is likely to be fixed, or even may be 
discouraged by public support (i.e. ‘crowding out’ effects).
18 From this perspective, the number 
of workers in the market that value quality highly may even decrease as a result of such 
intervention. Therefore, within the framework of Grabowski and Hirth, spill-over effects are not 
a strong argument for stimulating NFP organisations.  
3.5  Summing up 
When regarding the three sectors of interest, we may well conclude that there is no systematic 
difference that NFP organisations make with respect to FP organisations. This finding is 
 
18 We return to this issue in the next section.   37 
mirrored by the literature on relative inefficiencies and rents extraction in NFP organisations ─ 
that is, wages and efficiency levels are similar to those in FP organisations, and NFP 
organisations respond similarly to changes in the overall level competition in markets. This 
means that there is no strong argument for subsidising NFPs in particular, as this is likely to 
lead to additional rents extraction as well. Also, if e.g. quality effects of NFP organisations spill 
over to FP organisations ─ thus removing ex ante differentials in the quality of services 
between NFPs and FPs ─ there is no strong reason for government intervention.  
 
It is only in specific circumstances and for specific services that NFPs serve different market 
segments or provide services with higher quality. For the three markets under investigation, we 
only find evidence for a wider accessibility of services for specific groups and higher quality 
when regulatory measures by the public sector are absent or when competition is low. If the 
government adheres to these activities, the question arises what specific instruments are most 
suitable to stimulate these activities. In particular, should subsidies or regulatory measures be 
directed to the activities of organisations (‘generic’ policies), or should they be targeted at the 
legal (non-profit) status of organisations specifically? We address this issue in the next section.   38 
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4  Conditions for government intervention 
4.1  Instruments 
The previous sections provide us with a coherent framework along which the potential strengths 
and weaknesses of NFP vis-à-vis FP organisations are assessed. We now move to the 
implications of these observations for policy. Basically, there are three clusters of policy 
measures that may favour NFP organisations: 
 
•  Tax exemptions or lower tax rates, e.g. regarding the provision of private donations, expenses 
associated with voluntary work, or (labour) costs of NFPs in general. Most importantly, NFPs 
in the Netherlands are in principle exempted from corporate taxes on their surpluses. 
•  Favouring NFP organisations in public contracting processes, or in subsidisation rules. For 
instance, one may think of the provision of WTW activities, where public bodies act as 
contractors. At present, however, the room for public bodies to favour NFPs in contracting 
processes is limited to small amounts only (below € 30,000). As an alternative, specific 
subsidies ─ e.g. by municipalities to childcare organisations ─ may also be restricted to 
organisations that do not make profits.  
•  Only allowing for NFP organisations to exist within particular markets. Examples of these 
sectors in the Netherlands include hospitals and schools. 
 
Obviously, the degree of public sector intervention varies substantially between the three 
measure types, with the third as the most extreme. In markets with a high public interest ─ 
particularly the care sector ─ prohibiting FP organisations at least for some service types is 
common in some European countries. In the market for child care and WTW-organisations, the 
policy debate is mostly concentrated on tax exemptions and the contracting processes of public 
bodies. Here, markets are mixtures of FP and NFP organisations, and ─ in the case of WTW-
services ─ supplemented by public organisations. 
 
Although market types and relevant instruments may vary substantially, the basic conditions 
that are relevant for any type of intervention that is specifically directed to NFP organisations 
are in principle universal: (i) NFPs should make a (systematic) difference on (some) 
performance measures; (ii) residual market failures are important; (iii) performance outcomes 
are largely incontractable; (iv) public intervention should not crowd out donated labour too 
much; and (v) FP organisations should not switch into NFP organisations if these are 
subsidised. We now discuss these four conditions in detail.   40 
4.2  Condition (i): Making a difference 
As we have shown earlier, proving that NFPs indeed make a difference in some aspects is not 
an easy job. The general picture that emerges for our three cases is that NFPs do not make a 
systematic difference on performance compared to FP organisations. Still, in order to support 
them, the government should rely upon the fact that NFPs use the advantages of their non-profit 
status exclusively by making a difference, particularly when it comes to the quality level or 
accessibility of services that are provided. Rents should not be directed to higher wages, or 
other inefficiencies that are not to the benefit of consumers and/or society as a whole. When 
NFPs indeed do make a difference, for instance on quality aspects that are hard to measure, this 
suggests that additional rents are (also) directed to the wellbeing of consumers. If not, there is 
no strong reason to believe that public goals are served by targeting NFP organisations in 
particular. 
4.3  Condition (ii): Residual market failures  
Supposing that NFPs are effective in combating market failures, the next question is with 
respect to the importance of residual market failures ─ that is, market failures that are not 
(sufficiently) solved by NFPs. If residual market failures are present, NFPs in principle may 
further diminish the consequences of these market failures. For instance, think of NFP hospitals 
that indeed make a difference by providing specific services that are not cost effective but 
beneficial for society ─ e.g. for equity arguments. Now, if the public sector wants to extend the 
range of these services, it may encourage NFPs (as well as FPs) to do so. 
 
In the literature, the complex connection between NFP performance and the size of residual 
market failures is hardly addressed. In a way, this is not surprising, as there is little evidence of 
NFPs making a difference in combating market failures anyhow. There is some evidence 
however that points at the exchangeability of public sector regulation and the performance of 
NFPs. In the child care sector, as we have discussed in the previous section, Mocan (1995) finds 
NFPs to provide better quality in North Carolina, where quality regulation was little compared 
to other states. Thus, in this case the size of (residual) market failures is (partly) determined by 
the (absence of) public sector intervention. This raises the question whether regulatory 
measures for all organisation types are to be preferred over (tax) subsidies that are targeted at 
NFPs. 
4.4  Condition (iii): Incontractability 
When considering the three types of social services ─ care, child care and WTW ─ we have 
concluded that NFPs generally do not provide services with better quality. It is only in some   41 
cases that NFP organisations distinguish themselves from FP organisation by focusing on 
specific market segments or consumer types, e.g. segments with low competition or low income 
families, respectively. When such distributional concerns are supported by the government, 
NFPs may be subsidised for this. This, however, does not mean that NFPs should effectively be 
stimulated just because of their non-profit status. Instead, as the target groups ─ for instance 
disadvantaged workers ─ are well observable and can be contracted upon, the government may 
consider subsidisation by the target group itself, rather than NFP status. Similarly, subsidies 
may encourage the provision of services in areas with low physical access, and regulatory 
measure may aim to increase competition. For larger organisations providing (network) 
services, (local) governments can also formulate Universal Service Obligations (‘USOs’) in 
geographical areas to ensure services to be sufficiently accessible for consumers.
19 Thus, when 
subsidies or USOs are suitable instruments, there is no further rationale for governments to rely 
upon the legal status of organisations for performance outcomes that can be contracted upon.  
 
If the degree of incontractability is high, the effectiveness of regulatory measures may be 
limited. Then, under the assumption that conditions (i) and (ii) are fulfilled (i.e. NFPs make a 
difference; residual market failures do matter), this may be an argument to subsidise NFPs. 
Still, it should be noted here that this scenario is not very likely. First, when e.g. quality of 
services is hard to contract upon, it is difficult to show NFPs provide better quality than FPs 
anyhow. Second, in case of high incontractability, the government may (also) opt for a more 
extreme policy intervention, namely by the public provision of services.
20  
4.5  Condition (iv): No crowding out 
So far, we (implicitly) have assumed that NFP subsidies encourage the production of services 
by NFP organisations. This means that donated labour and donations for NFP organisations are 
exogenous. This, however, is at odds with the evidence. Instead, ‘crowding out’ effects occur: 
when the government decides to subsidise the provision of services or NFP organisations, or 
provides these services itself, employees and donators perceive that less donated labour and 
private funding is needed, respectively. In the US literature, there is strong evidence for 
crowding out effects, particularly regarding the relationship between government funding of 
public goods and private contributions to the provision of these goods (Glaeser and Schleifer, 
2000). For the Netherlands, there are no studies that analyse crowding out effects on the level of 
individual workers or donors. Still, at the macro level one may argue that crowding out effects 
are important, as the government funding of NFPs in the Netherlands is substantial compared to 
other OECD countries, whereas private donations are among the lowest. 
 
19 USOs are traditionally associated with utility industries, such as the postal services, telecommunications, electricity, and 
water. See De Bijl et al (2006) for a survey study on the design issues that come with the organisation of USOs. 
20 In the current setting, we abstract from this option and concentrate on (mixed) markets where only FP and NFP 
organisations operate.   42 
4.6  Condition (v): No re-labelling 
If NFPs are successful in attracting donated labour and donations, this may create substantial 
rents. Glaeser and Shleifer (2000) argue that in such situations completely self-interested 
entrepreneurs may (also) opt for the non-profit status. Even in the absence of tax advantages, 
donations and donated labour would flow to these entrepreneurs. Consequently, the 
accompanying rents are, at least for some part, likely to be spent in the interest of the 
entrepreneur, or ─ using a broader context ─ that of the management as well.  
 
David (2005) is one of the few studies that specifically addresses the decision of (new) 
entrepreneurs to adopt the FP or NFP status.
21 He argues that changes in tax codes and demand- 
and population growth have encouraged NFP hospitals in the US to switch ownership type. In 
particular, the cost advantage that was associated with the NFP status has declined, raising the 
share of FP hospitals. From this, we may conclude that tax advantages are one of the driving 
factors explaining the adoption of the NFP status. Although the evidence on this is still largely 
anecdotal and unexplored, it may well be that the child care sector in the Netherlands has 
experienced a similar change. Until 2005, NFP child care organisations were strongly linked to 
community councils, who favoured particularly NFP organisations in the contracting process. 
At present, individual parents are fully free to choose the child care organisation they want, 
rendering the former advantages of the NFP status for a large part useless (Noailly et al, 2007).   
4.7  Summing up 
The five conditions mentioned above make apparent that any form of government intervention 
that is specifically directed to NFP organisations may be blocked by various mechanisms. 
Essentially, all these mechanisms diminish the fraction of e.g. rents earned through tax 
advantages that is spent on the quality or accessibility of services: such advantages may be 
spent on inefficiencies (conditions 1 and 5); residual market failures are not very important or 
can be solved by standard regulatory policies (conditions 2 and 3); or donated labour and 
donations may be discouraged as a result of it (condition 4). 
 
There is no systematic evidence that NFPs in particular sectors, at least for the US, make a 
difference. In addition, there is evidence for crowding out effects and for the NFP status to be 
driven by rents considerations. Thus, one may doubt the effectiveness of any form of 
intervention that is specifically directed to NFPs. Instead, if the government wants to pursue the 
 
21 As we have shown earlier, there is also strong evidence that NFP organisations use part of their rents for better working 
conditions, higher wages and other benefits. This means that there is a potential for NFPs to use rents to the interest of the 
management and employees. Thus, the NFP provision of services can be a substitute for FP provision of entrepreneurs   43 
interest of consumers, the imposition of quality standards or subsidies for specific market 
segments or consumer types is more suitable.    44   45 
5  Summary and conclusions 
One framework for analysis.. 
This study provides a framework to assess the conduct and performance of NFP vis-à-vis FP 
organisations. Related to this, the framework helps us to formulate the relevant questions that 
need to be answered in order to evaluate the use of policy measures favouring NFPs in 
particular. The framework can be applied to a variety of markets where both organisation types 
are active. In particular, we have addressed three markets that can be characterised as ‘social 
services’: the hospital industry, the child care sector and welfare to work (WTW) sector. In 
these sectors, the provision of services requires a substantial degree of professionalism. This 
contrasts to so called ‘expressive functions’ that typically have a NFP status. At the same time, 
the public interest in these sectors is substantial (i.e. substantial information problems), and 
markets are typically mixed, with both FP and NFP organisations.  
 
The figure below summarises the route to be taken in order to answer the key question we 
formulated in the introductory section: “Under which conditions, and, if so, in what way should 
non-profits be stimulated?” To start with, we characterised NFPs as ‘market failure correcting 
devices’ (section 2). In the figure, the standard list of market failures is presented: asymmetric 
information, (positive) externalities, market power and distributional concerns. These market 
failures may trigger NFP organisations to act in the interest of consumers or society as a whole 
by providing higher quality of services and increasing the accessibility of services for 
consumers with a low income. Now, the next question to be addressed is whether NFPs indeed 
make a difference with respect to the quality and accessibility of services (section 3). If not, the 
public sector may decide to use generic regulatory or subsidy measures to combat market 
failures ─ irrespective of the legal status of service providers. Obviously, the most extreme 
policy response of the government is to provide the services itself.
22 If the answer is positive, 
we next address the importance of residual market failures. If market failures are still 
substantial, there are three additional conditions that should be met in order to favour NFPs vis-
à-vis FPs: performance outcomes should be hard to contract upon; subsidisation should not lead 
to substantial crowding out effects of donated labour and private donations; and FPs should not 
be triggered to become NFPs so as to extract subsidy rents. If these conditions are not met, 
more standard regulatory measures that are not directed to a specific legal status should be 
carried out to correct for market failures. 
 
 
22 As we have argued in the introductory section, we abstract from mixed markets where the public sector is also active as a 
provider of services. To get more insight in the issues relating to the choice of public sector intervention for the education 
sector, see e.g. chapter 6 of Appelman et al (2003).    46 
Figure 5.1  The framework for analysis: generic policies or specific policies needed for NFPs 
Market Failures:
quality ↓ and accessibility ↓












2. Substantial residual market 
failures?
4/5.  Crowding in or
relabeling effects?
Policies targeted at NFP 
organisations












.. applied to three sectors 
When surveying the literature for the US and Canada on hospitals, child care and WTW 
services, the key market failure is that of information asymmetries. In particular, service 
providers have the opportunity to skimp on quality aspects that are hard to monitor (‘moral 
hazard’). NFP organisations often consider the combat of these moral hazard problems as their 
primary goal ─ that is, they aim at providing better quality, which is to the interest of 
consumers. The evidence, however, suggests that NFPs only incidentally make a difference on 
quality. Thus, there is no strong argument here to favour organisations only because of their 
non-profit status. Instead, in order to raise quality levels, government intervention will be more 
effective by regulatory measures that apply to all service providers. 
 
When surveying the literature, there is only evidence that NFPs make a difference by providing 
services in markets with low competition or to specific consumer types. The first finding calls 
for policies to increase competition (e.g. by increasing market transparancy), rather than 
favouring NFPs. With respect to the second finding, the most apparent aims of NFPs seem to 
boil down to distributional concerns. If the government has similar interests, again this however 
is not an argument per se for favouring NFPs. Rather than that, subsidisation may take place by 
vouchers for specific consumer types. Particularly the accessibility of services by hospitals and 
child care organisations for low income customers is relatively well observable and therefore   47 
can be contracted on. Thus, again policies that (further) increase accessibility can be generic, in 
the sense that they apply to all organisations that focus on accessibility. 
 
NFPs are, similar to FP organisations, susceptive to rents extraction. Generally, wages that NFP 
organisations pay are not systematically lower than FP organisations, efficiency costs are 
similar, and NFPs seem to respond equally to changes in competition. What this suggests is that 
donated labour and donations of NFP organisations ─ creating an advantage with respect to FPs 
─ are not very important, or are undone by inefficiencies. 
 
Overall, for the three sectors under consideration the case for favouring NFP organisations is 
weak, which becomes apparent when listing the five conditions: (i) NFPs do not seem to make a 
systematic difference in quality of accessibility of services; (ii) Residual market failures are 
often hard to substantiate; (iii) Some performance aspects of accessibility and ─ to a lesser 
extent ─ quality can be contracted upon, irrespective of the legal status of organisations; (iv) 
Public sector support for NFPs may crowd out private donations and donated labour; and (iv) 
Public sector support may trigger FP organisations to become NFP as well, but maximising 
rents extraction by other means than profit extraction. Similar to markets with FP organisations 
only, the most apparent form of public sector intervention in mixed markets therefore is that of 
regulation. In particular, the public sector can increase market transparency and set quality 
standards, or subsidise the provision of services for particular consumer types or particular 
market types. Stated differently, it seems that the difference between NFPs and FPs in the social 
services sector is largely anachronistic, whereas the level of competition between firms ─ FP 
and NFP ─ is far more important in determining market outcomes.  
 
Policy implications 
One of the basic policy lessons that follows from the literature ─ at least for social services ─ is 
that governments should not subsidise or facilitate NFP organisations substantially, as there is a 
variety of mechanisms that weakens the power of such measures. Essentially, this lesson also 
applies to the Netherlands, at least with respect to the child care and WTW-sectors. In both 
sectors, the primary goal of the government should be to increase the transparency of 
performance outcomes of (all) service providers, rather than relying upon the benevolence of 
NFP organisations exclusively. In the childcare sector, the recent liberalisation act seems well 
in line with this notion ─ NFP organisations are no longer subsidised by communities with 
exclusive contracts ─ albeit that the childcare market is still far from transparent regarding the 
quality of services.  
 
For the Dutch care sector, the outcomes of the US studies should be interpreted with more care. 
Here, the basic difference with the US is that all hospitals in the Netherlands are NFPs (FP 
hospitals are prohibited). Thus, the hospital market is not a mixed market, rendering the US   48 
evidence less relevant for the Netherlands. In particular, the increased competition that results 
from the introduction of FPs may ─ when the quality control of hospitals is still insufficient and 
the reputation mechanisms is not active yet ─ result in substantial risks of rent seeking 
behaviour (see e.g. Janssen et al, 2006). Still, it should be noted here that hospitals in the 
Netherlands are not fully free from profits. In many hospitals, medical doctors and specialists 
do not have paid employment, but operate in partnerships where profits are allowed for. One 
way to test for the impact of profit motives is therefore to compare hospital types. Similarly, the 
government could experiment by allowing some hospitals in some markets (or for some 
activities) to make profits. 
 
Essentially, the formal mission of NFPs can be summarised as ‘making a difference’. From the 
analysis, we may conclude that the non-profit condition is not a sufficient condition for making 
a difference, in the sense that the quality or accessibility of services is better safeguarded than 
by FPs. This observation ─ or, stated differently, the absence of any proof that NFPs make a 
difference ─ in turn may discourage the provision of donated labour and private donations. It 
thus seems that public goals are best served by NFP organisations that clearly signal their 
missions and that ─ perhaps even more important ─ actively give account of their activities (see 
e.g. SER, 2005). This means they inform customers about the quality of services that have been 
provided, as well as the specific markets and client groups they want to focus on. Otherwise, 
there is a large risk that ─ particularly for larger organisations ─ the distinction between FP and 
NFP status becomes largely anachronistic. 
 
As a final remark, it should be stressed that our arguments against favouring NFPs by the 
government are not an argument against NFPs. Instead, from our analysis we conclude that 
NFPs in fact can make a difference vis-à-vis FPs, particularly in markets where competition is 
low and/or when there is not many regulatory measures being taken by the government. In these 
markets, NFPs are probably are capable of attracting intrinsically more motivated workers. 
More specifically, the virtues of NFPs are probably highest when market failures are 
substantial, and hard to be resolved by the government. But again, this is not an argument per se 
to stimulate NFPs, as one cannot (only) rely upon the legal status of these organisations.   
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